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THE INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
LYNDA W. POWELL
INTRODUCTION
Do campaign donors gain disproportionate influence in the
legislative process? Perhaps surprisingly, political scientists have
struggled to answer this question. Much of the research has not
identified an effect of contributions on policy; some political scientists
have concluded that money does not matter; and this bottom line has
1
been picked up by reporters and public intellectuals. It is essential to
answer this question correctly because the result is of great normative
importance in a democracy.
It is important to understand why so many studies find no causal
link between contributions and policy outcomes. The vast majority of
these studies have looked at the relationship between Political Action
Committee (PAC) donations to legislators and the roll call votes these
legislators cast. It is relatively easy to identify a set of votes that PAC
donors care about and thus determine whether legislators’ votes are
aligned with the interests of their PAC donors. It is, however, much
more difficult, as I will discuss, to determine the extent to which
contributions influence member’s voting decisions. More importantly,
2
as many of us have observed, the influence of contributions is most
likely to occur earlier in the legislative process, where less visible
actions are taken to kill bills quietly or to negotiate the details of
Copyright © 2014 Lynda W. Powell.
 Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester.
1. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Unleashing the Campaign Contributions of Corporations,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2012, at B1; George Will, This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC
television broadcast Nov. 27, 2005).
2. See, e.g., LYNDA W. POWELL, THE INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN
STATE LEGISLATURES (2012); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST (2011); Richard L. Hasen,
Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012); Richard L. Hall &
Frank Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional
Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797 (1990).
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legislation that can matter so greatly to donors.
Studying these subtler forms of influence is difficult. Although
there are illuminating and valuable anecdotal descriptions, systematic
3
research is much less common. There are two basic approaches—
observational case studies and large-scale survey-based research.
Each methodology has its strengths and weaknesses. My work using
survey-based measures is novel in this field, although it is widely used
in others. This paper focuses on what can be learned by adding
surveys to our usual repertoire of data sources.
Existing research on donors’ legislative influence has
concentrated on Congress and usually on just one chamber. At best,
such studies could determine if influence exists, and if it varies by
policy domain or by member characteristics, such as committee
chairmanship or constituency competitiveness. It is only relatively
recently that readily available sources of data, such as contributions to
4
candidates for state offices, have made it possible to do comparative
analysis of American legislatures. Scholars are just beginning to take
5
advantage of these opportunities.
Studying the fifty state legislatures, for example, as I did, makes it
possible to identify the institutional design features that incentivize
6
legislative fundraising and determine donors’ legislative influence.
State legislative chambers are similar enough in terms of their
electoral and institutional structures, culture, politics, and campaign
finance laws to make comparisons among them meaningful. Yet the
differences in these chambers’ legislative institutions and campaign
finance laws create substantial variation in the time legislators spend
fundraising and, consequently, in the influence of donors. That is, they
provide a “Goldilocks” data set for comparative analysis.

3. See DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, FREE LUNCH (2007), and ELIZABETH DREW, THE
CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1999), for excellent anecdotal discussions of the
influence of money by journalists.
4. The National Institute for the Study of Money in State Politics collects and releases
these data for the fifty states.
5. See, e.g., D. E. Apollonio & Raymond J. La Raja, Term Limits, Campaign
Contributions, and the Distribution of Power in State Legislatures, 31 Legis. Stud. Q. 259 (2006);
Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the
American States 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 552 (2013); Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological
Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530 (2011).
6. See generally POWELL, supra note 2.
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I found that a small number of factors explain much of the
variation among the chambers in both fundraising time and donor
7
influence. For example, states with professionalized legislatures
generally have large constituency sizes, highly paid members, and
professional leadership structures; these features along with chamber
size increase fundraising time and donor influence, while term limits
8
and an educated electorate decrease both.
In addition to contributions, there are other ways to use money to
influence legislative outcomes. Individuals who wish to influence
public policy can, most notably, spend money on lobbying, as well as
contribute. There is considerable debate among scholars about the
relationship between lobbying and contributing, and the effects of
lobbying in the policy process. My findings support the “access” view
of lobbying in which the opportunity to lobby is largely contingent on
9
campaign donations. If this view is correct, it shows a causal pathway
for donor influence. It also means scholars need to examine the
resources spent on both lobbying and donations to fully understand
the influence of money in the legislative process.
Finally, discussions of the legislative effects of money tend to focus
on the narrow “particularistic” legislative goals of contributors, but
some donors have broader ideological agendas. Studies have found a
relationship between affluence and influence—public policies
disproportionately favor the preferences of wealthier constituents
10
over those of others. Wealthy individuals have high rates of all types
of political participation, but it is the large amounts of money wealthy
11
individuals donate that most set them apart from other citizens.
Disparities in political contributions have been hypothesized to
explain wealth-related representational distortion, but we are just
beginning to find evidence suggestive of a causal role for campaign
contributions in representational inequality.

7. Id.at 207–09.
8. Id.
9. See John R. Wright, PAC Contributions, Lobbying and Representation, 51 J. POL. 713
(1989), for a discussion of the literature on the “access” view of lobbying.
10. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
11. SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, & HENRY BRADY, VOICE AND
EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 190 (1995).
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I. STUDIES RELATING PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO FLOOR VOTES IN
CONGRESS
Though a variety of approaches have been used to identify the
12
influence of contributions in the legislative process, the numerous
studies of the relationship between PAC contributions and roll call
votes have had the most influence in shaping the debate among
scholars, public intellectuals, and journalists.
The frequently cited study, Why Is There So Little Money in
13
Politics? is based on a meta-analysis of thirty-six studies of the
relationship between PAC contributions and Congressional floor
voting. The authors of the study, Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de
Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder state “that only one in four studies
from the previous literature support the popular notion that
contributions buy legislators’ votes. . . . [W]hen one controls for
unobserved constituent and legislator effects, there is little
14
relationship between money and legislator votes.”
Thomas Stratmann’s meta-analysis of the same thirty-six studies
rejected the null-hypothesis that PAC contributions had no influence
on the vote, but noted that, “[w]hether one believes that contributions
matter depends on whether one also believes that all of the studies
underlying the meta-analysis properly have controlled for the
15
potential simultaneous determination of contributions and votes.”
This is the key point at contention in determining whether or not PAC
contributions influence floor votes. The relationship between money
and votes is reciprocal. PACs are more likely to give to like-minded
legislators (those who are already more likely to vote in agreement
with their interests) and legislators’ votes in turn may be partly
determined by contributions. Statistically modeling the effect of
money on votes while controlling for a member’s initial voting
propensity has proven difficult, and is likely intractable. A study that
does not fully control for this endogeneity will overestimate the effect
of money on votes or find an effect when none exists. The subset of
studies that do identify an effect of money on votes are challenged for

12. See Lynda W. Powell, The Influence of Campaign Contributions on Legislative Policy,
11 THE FORUM 339 (2013), for a survey and critique of the larger literature.
13. Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo, & James M. Snyder, Why Is There So
Little Money in Politics? 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (2003).
14. Id. at 106.
15. Thomas Stratmann, Some Talk: Money in Politics. A (Partial) Review of the Literature,
124 PUB. CHOICE 135, 146 (2005).

POWELL 7.29.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

12/20/2014 4:29 PM

79

not fully controlling for the endogeneity between contributions and
legislative activity.
It is this literature, presumably, that journalist and political
commentator George Will drew on when he concluded, “[a]bundant
political science demonstrates that money flows to views—views do
16
not move toward money.” Journalist Eduardo Porter cited the
17
Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder study along with one other
in his New York Times article which stated, “[b]ut, overall, there is
little evidence that money is effective at swaying legislation or
18
improving the corporate bottom line.”
19
There are, as I have argued elsewhere, more fundamental
problems with this approach to studying the influence of
contributions. Floor votes are largely shaped by party, constituency,
20
and ideology. Thus, the set of votes that are most susceptible to
influence are those that are relatively unimportant to a legislator’s
constituency or party. Stacy Gordon argues that it is in a subset of
these votes—those in which an abstention or a switch of one vote
would flip the outcome—that legislators are most likely to repay their
21
obligations to donors. Thus, since contributions are likely to matter
on only a small fraction of floor votes, the effects of money will be
modest in magnitude and difficult to identify.
My interviews with legislators and journalists also suggest that,
even in the instances when votes are influenced by money, the causal
link between the two may be indirect and effectively unobservable. I
interviewed one legislative leader who explained that leaders ask
caucus members to vote in support of good friends of the party—
these good friends include large party donors. If a caucus member
flips their vote due to an appeal from their party leader, and is thus
indirectly influenced by party donors, no financial link will be
apparent between the member’s vote and the donor.
16. Will, supra note 1.
17. Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Michiko Ueda, Did Firms Profit
from Soft Money?, 3 ELEC. L. J. 193 (2004). See POWELL, supra note 2, at 342–45, 350–51, for a
more extensive discussion of the mixed findings from this literature.
18. Porter, supra note 1.
19. POWELL, supra note 2, at 16–19, 341–42.
20. The seminal works on this topic would include: JOHN E. JACKSON, CONSTITUENCIES
AND LEADERS IN CONGRESS (1974); JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S VOTING
DECISIONS, (1989); and John E. Jackson & John W. Kingdon, Ideology, Interest Group Scores,
and Legislative Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 805 (1992).
21. STACY B GORDON, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND LEGISLATIVE VOTING: A NEW
APPROACH 13 (2005).
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Donors, and the lobbyists who represent them, can frustrate our
ability to make causal connections as well. One journalist told me
22
about his attempt to identify the links between donors and votes. A
top lobbyist in the state capital told the journalist that he knew what
the journalist was trying to do and he would not succeed. The lobbyist
stated that if one client wanted to affect the likelihood a bill would
pass, he had a different client, who was uninterested in the bill, make
targeted donations to attain the first client’s goal. Thus, the donor on
record was not the interested party, simply a disinterested
intermediary. While this particular subterfuge may be rare, there are
many ways to donate that make it more difficult or impossible to
identify a relationship between donors and roll call votes.
However, the fundamental problem remains that donations are
much more likely to be influential earlier in the legislative process. As
Woodrow Wilson wrote over a century ago, Congress “legislates in its
23
committee-rooms.” He also, according to one intellectual history,
related this decentralized decision-making to Congress’s being
24
dominated “by the hidden influence of special interests.” Although
state legislatures often differ from Congress in the powers of their
standing committees, the observation that the details of legislation are
generally determined in committees holds in these state chambers as
25
well. Further, standing committees typically serve as gatekeepers by
26
determining which legislation reaches the floor for a vote. As Tom
Loftus, former Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly stated, “[t]he
truest thing I can say about special interest money is that it is mainly
27
given to buy the status quo.” Thus, donors who wish to block or
shape legislation focus their donations on members of the committees
22. See POWELL, supra note 2, at 16–17.
23. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT, A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 69 (Joshua Wilner ed., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 24th ed. 1981) (1885).
24. RONALD J. PESTRITTO, WOODROW WILSON AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN
LIBERALISM 16 (2005).
25. Not all chambers give committees the power to “kill a bill quietly.” In North Dakota,
every bill introduced is referred to a committee, but all bills receive a floor vote. The committee
may recommend the bill favorably or unfavorably, and with or without amendments. See
WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS
AND THE STATES 191 (10th ed. 2001).
26. For discussions of the gate keeping or negative agenda powers of congressional
committees, see, for example, CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN
CONGRESS 6–9 (1997); Kenneth Schepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of
Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (1987). For a similar discussion about state
legislatures see Keith E. Hamm, U. S. State Legislative Committee Decisions: Similar Results in
Different Settings, 5 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 31 (1980).
27. TOM LOFTUS, THE ART OF LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 46 (1994).
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28

that oversee their legislative interests.
Richard L. Hall and Frank Wayman authored the classic article
supporting the argument that we should look at the relationship
between PAC contributions and members’ committee activities to
29
observe the influence of money in the legislative process. Hall and
Wayman “found solid support for the importance of moneyed
interests in the legislative process,” which, at the time, was “[i]n
30
contrast to the substantial literature on contributions and roll calls.”
Their innovative work studied committee participation on one bill in
each of three Congressional House committees. They hypothesized
that PAC contributions are “allocated in order to mobilize legislative
31
support and demobilize opposition.” They found that these
contributions “did buy the marginal time, energy, and legislative
32
resources that committee participation requires.”
Hall and Wayman also illustrated the difficulty of determining
causality. Their case-study approach measured how much each
committee member participated in committee decisions, finding that
33
donations increased participation. But they did not determine
whether that participation favored the donor; nor did they ascertain
how influential contributions were in committee decisions. Their work
provided an important piece of evidence about the policy process, but
did not link contributions to the bottom line—the actual policy
outcomes. And, as in the roll call studies, questions remain about the
adequacy of controls for endogeneity.
II. CONCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE
Hall, in a more recent work with Alan Deardorff, discussed a
range of options delineating how contributions translate into
34
influence. They contrasted the “buying time” version of exchange
theory articulated by Hall and Wayman with an indirect model in
28. See, e.g., Kevin B. Grier & Michael C. Munger, Committee Assignments, Constituent
Preferences, and Campaign Contributions, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 24, 38 (1991) (finding that
“legislators on a committee with legislative and regulatory jurisdiction over an interest group
possess an institutional asset, the return to which is disproportionate contributions from that
interest group”).
29. Hall & Wayman, supra note 2, at 797.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 800.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 809–10.
34. Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 69 (2006).
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which PAC contributions either signal that the legislator has similar
35
aims as the PAC or, more strongly, the contributions buy “access.”
However, “the access” is not viewed as an “opportunity to request
favors,” but as an “offer to help on a matter that the legislators care
36
about.” This latter view is consistent with the argument that it is the
process that is corrupt, not the politician. Groups with greater
resources affect the prioritization of issues, thereby producing
unequal representation, while representatives simply accept funding
to subsidize work on issues they believe in.
Senator John McCain made a somewhat different argument about
37
process when he argued that Congress is corrupt. Senator Mitch
McConnell challenged McCain to identify the corrupt members,
arguing that if there was corruption, it must be traceable to
individually corrupt members. McCain instead answered that the
corruption was systemic:
I have personally experienced the pull from campaign staff
alerting me to a call from a large donor. I do not believe that any
of us privileged enough to serve in this body would ever
automatically do the bidding of those who give. I do not believe
that contributions are corrupting in that manner. But I do believe
they buy access. I do believe they distort the system. And I do
believe, as I noted, that all of us, including myself, have been
38
affected by this system.

McCain’s view suggests that money does not just subsidize a
member’s legislative priorities, but has a psychological “pull” as well.
Lawrence Lessig likens the exchanges between donors and elected
39
officials to a gift economy. Contributions create bonds that involve
obligations. Lessig cites Senator Paul Douglas’s description of public
corruption in which the public official is put:
[U]nder such a feeling of personal obligation that the latter
gradually loses his sense of mission to the public and comes to feel
that his first loyalties are to his private benefactors and patrons. . . .
[T]hroughout this whole process, the official will claim—and may
indeed believe—that there is no causal connection between the
35. Id. at 72.
36. Id. at 80.
37. See 145 CONG. REC. 25,410 (1999) (statement of Sen. McCain). Sen. McCain opened
debate on the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 1999 which he co-sponsored with Sen. Russ
Feingold by revealing his view that Congress was systematically corrupt.
38. Id. at 25,411.
39. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 107–14.
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favors he has received and the decisions which he makes.

Professor Glenn Parker similarly describes the symbiotic
41
relationship between lobbyists and legislators. Although interest
groups’ contributions do, according to Parker, serve legislators’
electoral goals, they also affect legislators’ priorities, encouraging
42
them to specialize in the areas of interest to donors. Through the
interactions established by these connections, legislators gradually
begin to adopt the policy perspectives of their donors.
Although quid pro quo corruption anchors one end of the
continuum defining the influence of money in the legislative process,
43
it is, as many of us argue, likely to be relatively rare. Instead, there
are a range of behaviors in which the legislator, consciously or
unconsciously, prioritizes the interests of donors over those of
constituents. Influence occurs when a legislator acts to favor donors in
a way he or she would not have absent contributions. Because there is
seldom an observable one-to-one relationship between a donation
and legislative activity that repays this obligation, it has proven
extremely difficult, but as my work shows, not impossible, to identify
the influence of contributions in the legislative process.
III. MEASURING INFLUENCE
Survey-based measures are often used when objective measures
are unobtainable. They are used, for example, to measure the left44
right placement of political parties in comparative politics, to
45
estimate candidates’ liberalism-conservatism, and to create indices
40. Id. at 110 (quoting Thomas M. Susman, Private Ethics, Public Conduct: An Essay on
Ethical Lobbying, Campaign Contributions, Reciprocity and the Public Good, 19 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 10, 15 (2008)).
41. GLENN R. PARKER, CAPITOL INVESTMENTS: THE MARKETABILITY OF POLITICAL
SKILLS 10 (2008).
42. Id. at 11.
43. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. 25,410 (1999) (statement of Sen. McCain); PAUL H.
DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 44 (1952); LESSIG, supra note 2, at 110; POWELL, supra
note 2, at 3.
44. See, e.g., KENNETH BENOIT & MICHAEL LAVER, PARTY POLITICS IN MODERN
DEMOCRACIES (2006); Francis G. Castles & Peter Mair, Left-Right Political Scales: Some
‘Expert’ Judgments, 12 EUR. J. RES. 73 (1984); Matthew J. Gabel & John D. Huber, Putting
Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos
Data, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 94 (2000); John Huber & Ronald Inglehart, Expert Interpretations of
Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies, 1 PARTY POL. 73 (1995); Paul V. Warwick, Do
Policy Horizons Structure the Formation of Parliamentary Governments? The Evidence from an
Expert Survey 99 AM. J. POL. SCI. 373 (2005).
45. See generally Larry M Bartels & John Zaller, Presidential Vote Models: A Recount 34
POL. SCI. & POL. 9 (2001) (measuring liberalism-conservatism in U. S. presidential candidates).
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of country-level corruption. Transparency International uses surveys
to measure corruption in 177 countries; the extensive use of their
measurements by scholars has made it possible to test and improve
46
our theoretical understanding of corruption.
I used a similar technique to measure the influence of
contributions in state legislatures. I asked legislators what we wish to
determine—“To what extent is the content and passage of bills in your
chamber influenced by the financial contributions of individuals and
groups to candidates and parties?” This question was included in a
national survey of 2,982 state legislators in all ninety-nine state
47
legislative chambers. Respondents were provided a seven-point scale
with one end labeled “Not at all influenced” and the other
48
“Completely determined.”
It is reasonable to ask how such inevitably subjective answers to
survey questions can measure influence. It is important to note that
legislators are not asked about their own actions, but about the extent
of influence in their chamber—a less threatening query. Even so,
respondents might, for example, consistently underestimate or
overestimate the influence of contributions. Insofar as my goal is to
make relative comparisons between chambers, my analysis will be
unaffected by any consistent bias. Of course, measurement error is
always present in survey responses. However, if measurement errors
are random, that is, unrelated to characteristics of respondents or
their chambers, the chamber comparisons and the ultimate analytical
results will be unbiased. Only measurement error that is not randomly
distributed across chambers is problematic, and even non-random

Survey methods are also used to measure the liberalism-conservatism of Congressional
candidates. See Lynda W. Powell, Issue Representation in Congress 44 J. POL. 658 (1982); Lynda
W. Powell, Analyzing Misinformation: Perceptions of Congressional Candidates’ Ideologies 34
AM. J. POL. SCI. 272 (1989).
46. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Seligson, The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A
Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries, 64 J. POL. 408, 415 (2002) (“Most
economists rely upon it when they examine the impact of corruption on growth and investment,
and it is no doubt the best overall indicator of national levels of corruption worldwide.”). A
large body of literature using the measure is widely cited. Studies based on the measure have
been published in top journals including American Journal of Political Science, Journal of
Politics, American Economic Review, Econometrica, British Journal of Political Science, and
Review of Economics and Statistics.
47. The survey was part of the Joint Project on Term Limits, a cooperative effort by state
legislative scholars and the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State
Governments, and the State Legislative Leaders Foundation. Support for the survey was
provided in part from NSF Grant No. SES-02131. POWELL, supra note 2, app. A at 215.
48. Id. app. A, at 218.
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errors are, if identified, correctable. Drawing on existing literature, I
controlled for five types of bias and used a Bayesian hierarchical
model to estimate the influence of contributions in each of the ninety49
nine chambers. I found that chambers vary greatly in donor
influence. My book focuses on modeling and explaining these
chamber differences in influence.
A. An Investment Model of Contributions
In order to understand why chambers differ in the degree to
which money influences policy, we need to understand the choices
individual legislators make to raise money and accommodate donor
interests. It is these individual decisions that ultimately determine
how much influence campaign donations have in legislatures.
Social scientists often use formal models to test assumptions about
the motives that underlie these decisions. My model makes the usual
assumptions of an investment model of campaigns, namely, that
candidates raise money to advertise in order to increase their chances
of election, while donors give to gain policy favors from successful
50
candidates. The more money a candidate raises, the more she
accommodates the policy interests of her donors in her legislative
decisions.
There are three important changes I make to the usual investment
model. First, because influence depends on the actions of individual
legislators, I begin with a model in which legislators choose how much
time to allocate to fundraising. Second, I add the possibility that
legislators may also fundraise, not for themselves, but for their caucus
in order to advance their career in the chamber. Increasingly in
51
Congress, and in some state legislatures, leadership positions and
committee chairmanships require substantial amounts of caucus
fundraising. Finally, I include parameters in the model to capture
differences in political and institutional fundraising incentives so that
the model yields predictions about how features of legislatures, such
as legislative compensation and term limits, affect the time members
49. Id. at 22–24.
50. See, for example, Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest
Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 90–91 (1986), in
which the authors focus “on the implicit market for policy, in which interest groups offer
contributions to legislators in exchange for legislators’ efforts on each interest group’s behalf.”
They assume candidates are vote maximizers while interest groups are policy maximizers. Id.
51. Eleanor Neff Powell, Where Money Matters in Congress, (2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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spend fundraising (for themselves and for their caucus) and
determine chamber level influence.
B. Empirical Analysis
My empirical analysis serves two purposes. First, if the many quite
varied predictions from the model are supported by empirical
analysis, the model’s assumptions that relate fundraising to donor
influence gain credibility, as does the validity of the survey-based
measure of influence. The findings do fit the expectations from the
model remarkably well. Thus, there is credible evidence that money
has legislative influence and we can measure it. Second, the
predictions, if accurate, can provide novel insights into how features of
institutional design affect legislators’ fundraising decisions and
determine the extent of donors’ legislative influence. These results can
suggest ways to more thoughtfully design our laws and institutions to
reduce the influence of money.
First, the correspondence between the model predictions and the
results is excellent. For individual legislators, the model yields twentyone different predictions relating personal, political, and institutional
factors to the time the legislators running for reelection report
devoting to fundraising for their own campaigns and for their caucus.
Nineteen of the coefficients are in the correct direction with fifteen
statistically significant (the two in the wrong direction are statistically
insignificant).
A legislator running for reelection is assumed to fundraise until
the marginal benefits of fundraising equal the marginal costs. The
legislator will divide her time between fundraising for her own
campaign and the caucus so that the marginal gains of fundraising for
self and caucus are equal. Thus, increasing the relative rate of return
on one type of fundraising increases the time spent on that type of
fundraising, reduces to a lesser extent the time spent on the other type
of fundraising, and increases the total time spent on fundraising.
Differences in legislative compensation provide an example to
illustrate these effects. A half-century ago reformers advocated for
higher salaries to make legislative service more desirable in order to
attract better candidates to run for office and to increase legislative
52
tenure and professionalism. In states where these reforms were
52. ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PROCESS,
PARTICIPATION, AND POWER IN STATE LEGISLATURES 54 (1998).
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adopted, higher salaries increased members’ reelection oriented
53
54
activities, which included increased fundraising. I expected, and
found, that more highly compensated legislators spend more time
fundraising for their own campaigns, slightly less time fundraising for
their caucuses, and, in net, slightly more time fundraising.
Most of the hypotheses I tested explain variation within chambers
between fundraising time for self and for caucus. For example,
compared to members in safe seats, members in marginal
constituencies will spend much more time fundraising for their own
campaigns, somewhat less time fundraising for their caucuses and, in
55
net, slightly more total time fundraising. These factors explain why
some legislators in a chamber may be more reliant on (and
accommodating to) donors than others. Since the ninety-nine state
legislative chambers differ relatively little in the competitiveness of
their legislative districts, this and similar individual-level factors that
determine fundraising time explain little of the variation among the
chambers in time and donor influence.
The remaining hypotheses involve chamber-level factors, such as
legislative compensation, that explain much of the chamber-level
variation in fundraising time. The model posits that the more time a
member devotes to fundraising, the more the member’s legislative
activity is influenced by donors. Thus I expected, and found, that
chamber-level donor influence is determined by the average time
members in a chamber spend fundraising for themselves, the average
time members in a chamber fundraise for their caucus, and by
chamber size, which determines the number of members eligible to
fundraise; these three factors explain about half the variance in donor
influence in the ninety-nine chambers. This is an impressive amount of
explanatory power for an analysis based on individual survey
responses. Interestingly, the results show, as expected, that it does not
matter whether a member devotes time to fundraising for the caucus
56
or for his own campaign; the effect on influence is the same.

53. Gerald Gamm & Thad Kousser, Broad Bills or Particularistic Policy? Historical
Patterns in American State Legislatures, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 151, 156 (2010).
54. Robert E. Hogan & Keith E. Hamm, Variation in District-Level Campaign Spending in
State Legislatures, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 59–80 (Joel A.
Thompson & Gary F. Moncrief, eds., 1998), at 72–73.
55. POWELL, supra note 2, at 90.
56. Id. at 134–36.
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Since fundraising is assumed to foster donor influence, the factors
hypothesized to explain chamber differences in fundraising time
should also explain chamber differences in influence. Again, the
correspondence between the model predictions and the results is
excellent. Seven factors are hypothesized to explain donor influence.
Six of the seven coefficients are in the right direction (the seventh is
57
58
zero). Five of these coefficients are statistically significant. The
consistency of results for factors that explain both fundraising time
and influence, as well as the observed relationship between
fundraising time and influence, supports the validity of the influence
measure as well as the basic premise of the model that relates
fundraising to donor influence.
In sum, it is particularly in the professionalized legislatures (often
found in large states) where features of institutional design
incentivize fundraising and create donor influence. These legislatures
tend to have large constituencies, well-compensated members, and
professionalized leaders. Term-limits, which were adopted in a large
minority of states, reduce the value of holding legislative office and
thus are expected to, and do, reduce fundraising time and donor
influence. Much of their effect is, however, blunted by the ambition
59
for other office that term limits induce. Members in term-limited
legislatures are just as interested in political careers as members in
other legislatures. Since their time in the chamber is limited, they can
only continue in elective office by running for another position.
Ambition for other office increases the value of, and hence the time
devoted to, both fundraising for self and caucus; each type of
57. The seventh coefficient measures leader compensation. This variable is highly
correlated with two of the other independent variables. This correlation combined, with its
crude measurement, makes it difficult to discern leader compensation’s effect and, thus, will bias
the coefficient towards zero.
58. POWELL, supra note 2, at 152–57.
59. As one term-limited California legislator explained:
I don’t think term limits [decrease the importance of money to legislators] at all. And
if you feel like you’re moving on, it’s just the opposite. And I think I’m a good
example of that. Given the district that I represent—a low-turnout, minority district—
I don’t have to raise very much money to get reelected. I might get away with raising
$50,000-100,000, just to be safe, but I don’t need more than that, and even that may be
overkill. Then, of course, the leadership wants me to raise a little bit more to give to
the caucus and to give to other members, and you start doing that. But now, I think ‘I
may have to move on from here. I may have to run statewide or for a regional office,
or whatever.’ Now, I don’t need to raise $100,000—I need to raise several million. . . . I
need to start developing my Rolodex now.
JOHN M. CAREY, RICHARD G. NIEMI, & LYNDA W. POWELL, TERM LIMITS IN THE STATE
LEGISLATURES 38 (2000).
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fundraising increases donor influence. Levels of ambition for other
60
offices vary greatly among the legislative chambers and the effects of
ambition on fundraising extend well beyond merely reducing the
influence of term limits. Chamber size also determines the degree to
which legislatures accommodate the interests of donors—the more
members, the more fundraising, and the greater the donor influence.
Finally, studies have consistently found that levels of public
61
corruption are lower in states with more highly educated citizens.
Donors too are less influential in these states, perhaps because more
highly educated voters may be more aware of legislator fundraising
and likelier to conclude that such legislators will be less likely to
represent their interests.
In net, these results show that donor influence is measurable and
varies substantially among the ninety-nine state legislative chambers.
The difference in the influence measure comparing the chamber with
the most influence to the least is 1.6 points on a seven-point scale.
How substantial is a difference of this magnitude? For comparison,
the chamber-level range of legislator self-placement on the standard
survey response seven-point liberalism-conservatism scale is 2.3
points. This range represents an enormous ideological gulf—the most
liberal chambers are over 75 percent Democratic while the most
conservative non-southern state is 88 percent Republican. The range
62
for donor influence is fully 70 percent of that for ideology. This
comparison suggests that the variation in influence is substantial and
substantively meaningful.

60. To reinforce just how striking this range is among various chambers:
In the upper chambers of North and South Dakota, Montana, Tennessee and in the
unicameral legislature of Nebraska, only 15-20% of members think they are likely to
run for other office. In other chambers, including both chambers in Louisiana, the
lower chambers in California and Arkansas, and the upper chambers in Florida and
Michigan, the percentages are as high as 70-90%.
POWELL, supra note 2, at 48.
61. See, e.g, James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, The Political Economy of Institutions
and Corruption in American States, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 341, 358 tbl. 3 (2003); Edward L.
Glaeser & Raven E. Saks, Corruption in America, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1053, 1055 (2006); Amanda
E. Maxwell & Richard F. Winters, A Quarter-Century of (Data on) Corruption in the American
States, (Apr. 15-18, 2004) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest
Political
Science
Association)
(manuscript
at
18)
,
available
at
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~rwinters/AM&RW2004.pdf.
62. POWELL, supra note 2, at 29.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE RESEARCH
Campaign finance scholars will find some of these findings about
the effects of institutions unsurprising, providing reassurance that the
general model and its assumptions are reasonable. Other findings are
novel and yield new insights into the incentives that underlie
fundraising and their consequences. Four general conclusions can be
drawn from the fine-grained findings.
63
First, especially given recent Supreme Court decisions, campaign
finance laws are, at least in the short term, unlikely by themselves to
effectively restrain the flow of influence-seeking donations into
politics. Certainly campaign finance laws are important and many
64
think them essential. Yet, frustratingly, laws often seem to only
redirect the flow of money into politics without greatly lessening it.
Further, it is difficult to determine which regulations will most
effectively mitigate the influence of campaign donors. For example,
clean election laws required candidates who accepted public funds to
65
largely forego private fundraising for their election campaigns. These
laws were adopted to reduce the influence of big donors both in
66
campaigns and in the legislative process. Such laws were in effect in
67
two states at the time of my survey. Of course, these clean election
laws virtually eliminated the time participating legislators spent
fundraising for their own campaigns, but, as expected from the model,
these participating legislators spent part of the time saved on
additional fundraising for their caucus. Those legislators’ total
fundraising time was somewhat reduced, but not by as much as
reformers anticipated.

63. See three recent decisions, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); and FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007),
each of which weakened existing campaign finance regulations.
64. See, e.g., Montana’s Opposition to the Application of a Stay of the Montana’s Supreme
Court’s Decision Pending Certiorari, Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490
(2012) (per curiam) (No. 11-A762), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/11A762-AG-response-2-15-12.pdf. Attorney General Bullock argued
that the Supreme Court was being asked to “invalidate Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act—an
Act that has safeguarded the republican form of government in Montana for a century from the
scourge of political corruption.” Id. at 1.
65. E.g., Neil Maholtra, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral Competition:
Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 8 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 263, 263 (2008) (citing clean election
laws that allow “candidates to use taxpayer dollars to fund their campaigns in exchange for
accepting spending limits and forgoing private contributions”).
66. Id.
67. The two states were Maine and Arizona. Id. at 266–67.
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Second, the effectiveness of campaign finance laws can be
conditional on features of institutional design and politics. Trying to
determine the extent to which a campaign financial regulation
“bites”—that is, the extent to which it reduces donations—is thus
complex and can vary from state to state, from lower to upper
chamber, and over time. Continuing the clean election laws example,
the extent to which clean election laws reduce total fundraising
should be, based on the model, dependent upon the value of caucus
fundraising.
Chambers with professionalized leadership structures were
particularly effective in incentivizing members to fundraise for their
caucus. And caucus fundraising was more rewarding when the
majority party had a thin margin of control—that is, when the next
election could potentially flip chamber control. Thus, clean election
laws should be most effective in reducing total fundraising time when
caucus fundraising is least rewarding, namely in chambers with lopsided margins of party control accompanied by weak leadership
structures.
Third, both of the two prior points provide an example that
illustrates why it is difficult and problematic to score states on the
stringency of their campaign finance laws. More generally, we do not
know the relative impact of the specifics of campaign finance
regulations (those related to limits, disclosure and public funding) on
reducing fundraising time. Further, the effectiveness of any one
provision, for example, limits on fundraisers held during the
legislative session, may also be dependent on the specifics of other
provisions of the law. Similarly, effectiveness may also depend on
aspects of chamber politics and features of institutional design, such
as those described in the preceding paragraph.
Fourth, some observers may be tempted to infer state differences
in donor influence by comparing the average amount of money an
incumbent raises in one state to the average raised in another. These
comparisons can be misleading. Differences in average fundraising
time do correspond to differences in chamber levels of donor
influence. The amount of money a legislator raises is equal to the
product of the time she spends fundraising and her rate of return on
her time (the amount she raises per unit of fundraising time). Within a
chamber, differences in rates of return are related to differences in the
influence individual members (and potentially their donors) have
over the policy agenda. It makes sense for a donor to spend more
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money to attend the fundraiser of a committee chair than that of a
freshman legislator.
However, differences among chambers in average rates of return
are, in my analysis, unrelated to differences in donor influence. Why is
there no relationship at this macro (chamber) level while there is at
the micro (member) level? Chamber rates of return are largely
dependent on the size of a state’s economy (measured by its gross
state product and the number of registered lobbyists) and also on the
68
absence of contribution limits and chamber size. These variables,
along with a control for tied chambers, explain 86 percent of the
variance in chamber-level rates of return. One way to think about
these factors is that they determine the size of a donation needed to
create a relationship or a sense of obligation between a donor and a
legislator. The amount that “significant” donors give in one state may
be much larger than the amount “significant” donors contribute in
another state. Thus chamber fundraising averages, which depend not
just on fundraising time, but also on these rates of return, may not
correspond that closely to levels of donor influence.
Currently, reformers focus on campaign finance laws as the way to
reduce the influence of money in politics. While these laws may help
limit the influence of contributions, they do not address the root of
the problem—the institutional features of legislatures that incentivize
fundraising. Many legislators themselves complain about the time and
obligations linked to financing expensive campaigns. If we wish to
reduce the pressures that members in some chambers face to raise
money, we need to consider institutional reforms to change
fundraising incentives. Because much of the literature on campaign
finance has focused only on Congress, little attention has been
devoted to understanding how features of institutional design and
politics structure fundraising incentives and determine levels of
influence in legislatures. These factors explain much of the difference
in fundraising effort and in donor influence, and these features of
institutional design may be legally more modifiable and effective in
reducing the influence of money than reforms implemented through
campaign finance regulations.

68. Rates of return are greater in states with larger economies and no limits on donation
size, and they are lesser in larger chambers. POWELL, supra note 2, at 134–35.
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V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND
LOBBYING
In addition to campaign contributions, lobbying is another way to
use financial resources to influence legislative outcomes. If giving and
lobbying are relatively unrelated activities, the effects of each on
policy could be studied separately. But if they are linked, neither can
be studied in isolation from the other. There are two different theories
of lobbying. Some argue that lobbying access is largely contingent on
69
campaign donations and furthers donors’ goals. Others contend that
legislators can be informed about policy issues by lobbyists without
70
being significantly influenced. In this latter view, the legislators most
dependent on lobbyists are those who gain the most value from the
information lobbyists provide.
The survey of legislators I analyzed provided an opportunity for a
critical test of these two opposing theories of lobbying. Each makes
different predictions about which legislators should rely more on
lobbyists. The “access” model predicts that the more time a member
devotes to fundraising, and the greater his relative rate of return on
71
his fundraising time, the more he will rely on lobbyists for
information. The informational model predicts that members at an
informational disadvantage, such as new members, members in larger
chambers, members in chambers with greater turnover in office, and
members interested in greater numbers of issue, will be more reliant
on lobbyists. In the survey, each legislator was asked how important
lobbyists were to him as a source of information, and this allowed me
72
to test the two views of lobbying against each other. My results
69. See, e.g., Clyde Wilcox, The Dynamics of Lobbying the Hill, in THE INTEREST GROUP
CONNECTION: ELECTIONEERING, LOBBYING, AND POLICYMAKING IN WASHINGTON 90 (Paul
S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, Clyde Wilcox, eds., 1998) (“There are a variety of strategies to
gain [lobbying] access. One of the most common is to contribute to the campaign of a member .
. . . There is considerable evidence that campaign contributions do help groups gain access to
the member.”).
70. For formal models of this argument see David Austen-Smith, Information and
Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 799 (1993), and Randall L.
Calvert, The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice, 47 J.
POL. 530 (1985). Hall & Deardorff, supra note 34, come close to this argument as well.
71. A member’s rate of return is the amount contributed by others to his campaign divided
by the amount of time he reports fundraising. His relative rate of return is his rate of return
divided by the average rate of return in his chamber.
72. Legislators were asked, “As you consider the various sources of information available
to you as a legislator how important are each of the following?” Lobbyists were one of the
sources asked about in a list of nine sources. Respondents were provided with a five-point scale.
One endpoint was labeled “Not Important At All” and the other “Very Important.” See
POWELL, supra note 2, at 185–86.
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cleanly and strongly support the “access” view of lobbying. None of
the coefficients that test the informational view are statistically
significant and several are in the wrong direction. The three
coefficients for the variables that test the “access” view of lobbying
are each statistically and substantively significant and, as expected,
time spent fundraising for self and for caucus have equal effect on the
degree to which members rely on lobbyists.
These findings suggest a mechanism of effect for contributions
through lobbying, although they do not preclude other pathways of
donor influence. Further, the linkage between lobbying and
contributing means that those of us who study campaign finance must
also take account of lobbying activity to more fully understand the
complex relationships that constitute influence.
VI. CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND POLICY REPRESENTATION
Scholars have also considered whether our evolving campaign
finance system has exacerbated the relationship between “affluence”
73
and “influence” in our political system. Larry Bartels, for example,
observed that “the political process has evolved in ways that seem
likely to reinforce the advantages of wealth. Political campaigns have
become dramatically more expensive since the 1950s, increasing the
reliance of elected officials on people who can afford to help finance
74
their bids for reelection.”
Thus far, I have only considered the effects of contributions in the
legislative process—that is, on members in office. However,
contributions may also influence who attains office by affecting who
runs for office and which candidates win primaries and general
elections. Elections determine the party, ideologies, and issue
orientations of legislative officeholders, and, in a democratic system,
are expected to create representative institutions. In evaluating how
well we achieve the normative ideal of representation, it is important
to consider the effects of money in both the electoral and legislative
processes.
Contributions have legislative influence because they are valuable
electoral resources. Candidates raise funds to spend on their own

73. E.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE & INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012).
74. LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
NEW GILDED AGE 2 (2008).

POWELL 7.29.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

THE INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

12/20/2014 4:29 PM

95

campaigns, and many legislators also raise money that they re-gift to
other candidates in order to advance their own legislative careers.
Many of the individual and PAC donors who contribute to legislative
incumbents give to members who sit on committees that oversee their
75
legislative interests. They give to obtain or maintain policies that
favor their concerns. In contrast to these “materially” motivated
donors, others give to advance a broad issue or ideological agenda.
These “purposive” donors are more likely to give to challengers, open
seat candidates, and to the small fraction of incumbents up for
76
reelection in competitive races. They focus on these particular types
of candidates and elections in order to maintain or alter the partisan
and ideological composition of our legislatures. Finally, some
“solidary” donors have neither politically purposive nor material
motivations. Often these solidary donors are mobilized by their
politically motivated family, friends, or business associates who can
gain “credit” with candidates for the funds they raise from others.
Thus, a portion of the funds given by these solidary donors will serve
to advance the material or purposive goals of fundraising
intermediaries.
Donors make choices about how to allocate their funds to best
achieve their goals. Some candidates are more attractive to
ideological or partisan purposive donors while others are more
77
appealing to materially minded contributors. Campaign finance laws,
by determining who may give and how much they may give, can
potentially advantage candidates who appeal to one type of donor
rather than another. For example, laws that impose limits on
donations from corporations or unions may reduce the inflow of
campaign dollars from one type of donor, material in this example,
thus incidentally advantaging candidates who raise money primarily
from purposive donors. This might result in more extreme ideological
candidates, who hold greater appeal to purposive donors, gaining at
the expense of rent-seeking incumbents, who receive more funds from
materially oriented contributors.

75. GRIER & MUNGER, supra note 28, at 38.
76. For more detailed discussions of donor motives, see CLIFFORD W. BROWN JR., LYNDA
W. POWELL, & CLYDE WILCOX, SERIOUS MONEY: FUNDRAISING AND CONTRIBUTING IN
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION CAMPAIGNS (1995), and PETER L. FRANCIA, JOHN C. GREEN,
PAUL S. HERRNSON, LYNDA W. POWELL, & CLYDE WILCOX, THE FINANCIERS OF
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (2003).
77. Of course, realistically, contributors have a mix of purposive, material, and solidary
motives and their contribution decisions will reflect their varied goals.
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By altering the extent to which different types of donors put
money into politics, campaign finance rules can affect who chooses to
run for office, their electoral prospects, and thus the ideologies and
legislative priorities of candidates before they even win election. And
the sheer volume of money itself, which also is dependent on
regulatory decisions and constitutional constraints, gives greater
“voice” and influence to donors, potentially resulting in greater
representation for donors at the expense of other citizens.
Studies find, not surprisingly, that wealthy individuals participate
78
more in politics than those with less wealth, and this inequality of
participation is greatest for the financial contributions that candidates
79
depend upon to attain office. This participation leads to greater
80
81
representation for the wealthy. Martin Gilens and Larry Bartles
showed that elected officials respond more to the preferences of
wealthy Americans than to those of other citizens. By examining the
electoral policy positions of each major party’s candidates, Elizabeth
Rigby and Gerald Wright, found that unequal responsiveness begins
82
early in the policy process.
Gilens determined that the degree of representational distortion
83
in policy outcomes related to wealth varies by issue area. On most
issues, the wealthy are advantaged, but for four specific social welfare
policies “there is no evidence that the middle class or the poor lose
84
out when their views diverge from those of the well-off.” Stuart
Soroka and Christopher Wlezien further caution that inequality of
representation will be limited if policy preferences vary little by
85
income group. They find that spending preferences on eight policy

78. E.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA, & HENRY E. BRADY, THE
UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 122–23 (2012) (“[W]ith the single exception of attending a protest,
political activity rises with socio-economic status.”); see also VERBA ET AL., supra note 11, at
189.
79. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 124–25 fig. 5.2.
80. GILENS, supra note 73, at 76 (“Turning next to the differences in policy responsiveness
for respondents at different income levels, we find, as expected, that higher-income
respondents’ views are more strongly related to government policy.”).
81. BARTELS, supra note 74, at 257–74.
82. Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Political Parties and Representation of the Poor
in the American States, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 552, 552–53 (2013).
83. GILENS, supra note 73, at 122.
84. Id.
85. Stuart N. Soroka & Christopher Wlezien, On the Limits to Inequality in
Representation, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 319, 324 (2008).
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86

domains generally differ modestly by income tertiles.
In each of these studies the top wealth group is defined as the top
third to top tenth of the general population. Economists have recently
drawn attention to a much smaller segment of Americans, the top one
87
percent. This group has shown the greatest gains in wealth in recent
years. These individuals are too rare to study using general population
surveys. Benjamin Page, Larry Bartels, and Jason Seawright are
involved in a collaborative effort to survey this top one percent of the
88
wealthiest Americans. They report on a preliminary study conducted
in Chicago. In contrast to the top percentile of wealth in the Soroka
and Wlezian study, the top one percent in the Page et al. study
differed markedly from the average public on a number of spending
priorities. The top one percent are especially conservative and results
suggest the top one-tenth of one percent are yet more conservative,
89
differing substantially from the general public.
Scholars have identified the extensive political participation of the
wealthy, in particular their campaign contributions, as a possible
causal mechanism to explain the representational distortions that
90
favor them. The top one percent are especially notable in terms of
their contribution activity. Page, Bartels, and Seawright found that the
top one percent participate extensively in politics—68 percent of their
respondents made a contribution (averaging $4,633) and 21 percent
91
had solicited or bundled contributions. Forty percent had contacted
at least one of their United States Senators and 37 percent had
contacted their House member. Almost half of these contacts focused
92
on a “narrow issue of economic self-interest.”
There is also data indicating that although the wealthy are a small
fraction of all donors, their donations constitute a large fraction of
political contributions. Pew Research Center found that 16 percent of
Americans reported making a political contribution in the year
preceding their 2012 survey, a finding similar to the eighteen percent

86. Id. at 322–23 figs. 2 & 3.
87. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED
SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2013).
88. Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels, & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the Policy
Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51 (2013).
89. Id. at 64–65.
90. See, e.g., BARTELS, supra note 74, at 275–80; GILENS, supra note 73, at 239.
91. Page, Bartles, & Seawright, supra note 88, at 53–54.
92. Id. at 54.
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reporting giving in 2008. Thus, the 68 percent of the top one percent
constitute a small fraction of donors. However, the likelihood of
making a large enough contribution to require public disclosure, the
number of contributions, and the size of a contribution are all
94
increasing functions of income. Therefore, a relatively small number
of quite wealthy individuals give a large fraction of the total dollars
donated in politics. Indeed, estimates of the fraction the top one
percent of the one percent of donors (31,385 individuals) contributed
in the 2012 election range from 28 percent to over 40 percent of all
95
disclosed contributions.
Thus it is not surprising that campaign contributions are a causal
mechanism scholars frequently point to in order to explain the policy
influence of wealthy Americans. Bartels, for example, rejects socioeconomically related differences in voting turnout, political
knowledge, and contacting elected officials as explanations for the
96
representational disparities he finds. Instead he states, “[a] tempting
alternative hypothesis is that the disproportional influence of affluent
constituents reflects their disproportional propensity to contribute
97
money to political campaigns.” His data do not provide the needed
information to test this explanation, but he cites the similarity
between the giving and wealth numbers provided by Sidney Verba,
Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady’s study of participatory
98
inequality, and his own aggregate results as consistent with a
contribution explanation. Gilens similarly states, “[p]olitical
donations, then, but not voting or volunteering, resembles the pattern
99
of representational inequality we saw in earlier chapters.”

93. AARON SMITH & PEW RESEARCH CENTER, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE DIGITAL
AGE: PART I: ONLINE AND OFFLINE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICA 8 (2013), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/oldmedia//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_CivicEngagementintheDigit
alAge.pdf.
94. FRANCIA ET AL., supra note 76, at 110–11.
95. Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, & Howard Rosenthal, Why Hasn’t
Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality? 27 J. Econ. Persp. 103, 112 fig. 5 (2013) (estimating the
one percent’s share of the total disclosed campaign contributions in 2012 was over 40 percent);
Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION BLOG (June 24,
2013, 9:00 AM) (estimating that the top one percent donated 28 percent of the total disclosed
contributions in 2012), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/.
96. BARTELS, supra note 74, at 275–80.
97. Id. at 280.
98. VERBA ET AL., supra note 11.
99. GILENS, supra note 73, at 239.
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Although these studies make a strong argument for the
relationship between political contributions and economic inequality
of representation, we lack studies that make the exact causal linkages
needed for affirmation. If political contributions are part of the causal
explanation for the outsized influence of the wealthy, how might
campaign finance regulations mitigate this representational
distortion?
Some argue that broader adoption of matching programs for small
donors would reduce politicians’ dependence on large donors and
100
result in better representation for citizens. In these programs public
funds match the contributions of small donors to increase the
importance of small contributors in the donor pool. Multiple
matching programs are particularly effective at leveraging the power
of small donors. The New York City program matches the first $175 of
each eligible contribution at a six-to-one ratio, providing a six-times
101
multiplier for small donations.
The argument for matching
contribution programs for small donors rests on the reasonable
supposition that reducing the fraction of money from big givers will
diminish their influence, but as yet, we have no empirical evidence on
the representational effects of these laws.
Instead of enhancing the contributions of small donors, others
favor constraining donations from wealthy actors, such as
corporations and unions. These choices can advantage or
disadvantage different types of donors. For example, laws that
constrain rent-seeking material donors should theoretically advantage
purposive ideological donors and the more extreme candidates they

100. Campaign
Finance
for
the
Empire
State
Testimonials, NY LEAD,
http://nylead.org/about-us/testimonials/, (last visited July 21, 2014) (recounting testimonials of:
(1) Dennis Mehiel, Chairman and CEO of U.S. Corrugated and Battery Park City, noting “[a]
system of small donor matching funds is a good answer. It will encourage business growth, help
constituents hold candidates and officials accountable and ensure fair legislation in Albany;” (2)
Sherwood Boehlert, former Congressman from New York’s 23rd District, opining that
“[l]awmakers would be allowed to focus on what they came to Albany to do—serve the broad
public interest and make decisions that are in the best interests of the people;” (3) Jane
Sherburne, General Counsel, BNY Mellon, commenting that, “[t]his effort is about achieving
reforms that ensure that the interests of our elected leaders are aligned with the people they
represent;” and (4) Dick Dadey, Executive Director of Citizens Union, saying, “[w]ith a public
matching system that puts the public interest’s voice on a more level-playing field, state
government will become more responsive and accountable”).
101. For a description of the New York City matching funds program, see NEW YORK CITY
CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., Overview of Matching Funds Program, http://www.nyccfb.info/candidates
/candidates/publicmatchingfunds.aspx, (last visited July 21, 2014).
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support. Michael Barber found evidence consistent with this effect.
Lower limits on contributions from PACs resulted in more
ideologically extreme state legislators, as did higher rather than lower
limits on individual donors. Altering the balance between purposive
and material donors could affect the nature of any representational
distortion as well—social issues, for example, should be more salient
to purposive donors than to material givers.
CONCLUSIONS

Measuring the influence of contributions on roll call votes has
proven difficult, if not impossible. More importantly, donor influence
is likely to occur earlier in the legislative process, especially in
committees, where bills are written, marked up, and often simply
killed quietly. Ideally, we want a measure that captures the full
influence of donors in the legislative process, including the actions
that do not leave a data trail. Elite surveys are often used to construct
such comprehensive measures. I develop a theory that links
legislators’ campaign fundraising to the policy choices they make in
office. This theory allows me to derive a lengthy list of predictions
about how politics and institutions affect the time each member
spends on fundraising for herself and on fundraising for her caucus
and on donor influence in the member’s chamber. The consistency
and accuracy of the predictions for fundraising times and influence
supports the validity of the survey measure of influence.
The bottom line is that institutions matter greatly in determining
levels of donor influence in chambers. Along with politics, institutions
establish the incentives that fuel fundraising. They produce wide
variation in donor influence—donors have considerable influence in
some chambers and little in others. Institutional effects are also
nuanced and complex. Term limits, for example, by reducing the value
of holding office, diminish fundraising and influence. But in termlimited legislatures members can only continue their elective careers
by running for other offices. Ambition for other office increases
fundraising and hence donor influence. These two effects of term
limits largely cancel each other out, perhaps slightly decreasing
fundraising and influence.
102. Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of
State Legislatures 4 (Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://static.squarespace.com/static/
51841c73e4b04fc5ce6e8f15/t/52275a92e4b03f583b4b4047/1378310802196/Limits.pdf
(unpublished manuscript).
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Campaign finance laws are advocated to reduce donor influence.
Their effects, however, will be contingent on the institutional systems
in which they are situated. Institutions and laws cannot be studied in
isolation. They are complex, interrelated, and evolving systems that
shape both donor and legislator behaviors. We constantly face new
challenges to understand these phenomena. Increases in independent
expenditures, for example, raise vital new questions. Do donors who
make independent expenditures gain the same influence in the
legislative process as those who contribute to political campaigns? Or,
103
as the Supreme Court has determined, does their separation from a
candidate’s campaign eliminate any “corrupting” influence? Further,
are those who raise more from independent expenditures, often
argued to be ideologically motivated, less willing to engage in
legislative bipartisanship, and thus more firmly polarized in their
positions?

103. See Citizens United v. FEC., 588 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (“The absence of
prearrangement and coordination of an [independent] expenditure with the candidate or his
agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the
danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
candidate.” (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976))).

